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Código :47260
Título:FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANTIAL STRUCTURE
Autor : Hart - Oliver -
Año Edición: 2009
Edición:
Lugar de Edición: Estados Unidos de América
Páginas: 230 - Vols.: 1
Encuadernación: Rústica
Idioma : Inglés
Precio : $ 58.548 (IVA incluído)
Stock : 1     Disponibilidad inmediata
Disponible en : El libro lo encuentra en las sucursal de Huérfanos 611
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Descripción de la obra
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PREMIO NOBEL DE ECONOMÍA  - 2016

This book provides a framework for thinking about economic
relationships and institutions such as firms. The basic argument is that in
a world of incomplete contracts, institutional arrangements are designed
to allocate power among agents. The first part of the book is concerned
with the boundaries of the firm. It is argued that traditional approaches
such as the neoclassical, principal‐agent, and transaction costs theories
cannot by themselves explain firm boundaries. The book describes
a theory—the incomplete contracting or property rights approach—
based on the idea that power and control matter when contracts are
incomplete. If the terms of a transaction can always be renegotiated, the
incentives of a party to undertake relationship‐specific investments will
depend crucially on the ability to control the use of productive assets
when renegotiation takes place. Asset ownership becomes an essential
source of power. The theory suggests that firm boundaries are chosen to
allocate power optimally among the various parties to a transaction. The
foundations of incomplete contracting are also discussed.
The remainder of the book applies incomplete contracting ideas to
understand the financial structure of closely held and public companies.
The analysis illustrates how debt acts as an automatic mechanism
to constrain the behaviour of managers or owners of both kinds of
companies. In closely held companies, debt can force an entrepreneur to
pay out funds to investors rather than to himself. In a public company,
ownership is dispersed among small shareholders causing a separation
between ownership and control. It is argued that debt and equity
choices, capital structure decisions, bankruptcy procedures, corporate
governance, and takeovers, play a substantial role in limiting the ability
of a (self‐interested) manager to make unprofitable but power‐enhancing
decisions.

Resultado de imagen para OLIVER HART


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