Librería Especializada Olejnik: FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANTIAL STRUCTURE

Código :47260

Título:FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANTIAL STRUCTURE

Autor : Hart - Oliver -

Año Edición: 2009

Edición: 1ª

Lugar de Edición: Estados Unidos de América

Páginas: 230 - Vols.: 1

Encuadernación: Rústica

Idioma : Inglés

Precio : $ 58.548 (IVA incluído)

Stock : 1 Disponibilidad inmediata

Disponible en :

Imprimir

Materias:

DERECHO CIVIL/DERECHO PRIVADO/HIPOTECARIO

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Descripción de la obra
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PREMIO NOBEL DE ECONOMÍA - 2016

This book provides a framework for thinking about economic

relationships and institutions such as firms. The basic argument is that in

a world of incomplete contracts, institutional arrangements are designed

to allocate power among agents. The first part of the book is concerned

with the boundaries of the firm. It is argued that traditional approaches

such as the neoclassical, principal‐agent, and transaction costs theories

cannot by themselves explain firm boundaries. The book describes

a theory—the incomplete contracting or property rights approach—

based on the idea that power and control matter when contracts are

incomplete. If the terms of a transaction can always be renegotiated, the

incentives of a party to undertake relationship‐specific investments will

depend crucially on the ability to control the use of productive assets

when renegotiation takes place. Asset ownership becomes an essential

source of power. The theory suggests that firm boundaries are chosen to

allocate power optimally among the various parties to a transaction. The

foundations of incomplete contracting are also discussed.

The remainder of the book applies incomplete contracting ideas to

understand the financial structure of closely held and public companies.

The analysis illustrates how debt acts as an automatic mechanism

to constrain the behaviour of managers or owners of both kinds of

companies. In closely held companies, debt can force an entrepreneur to

pay out funds to investors rather than to himself. In a public company,

ownership is dispersed among small shareholders causing a separation

between ownership and control. It is argued that debt and equity

choices, capital structure decisions, bankruptcy procedures, corporate

governance, and takeovers, play a substantial role in limiting the ability

of a (self‐interested) manager to make unprofitable but power‐enhancing

decisions.